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Summary
This paper considers ancient and some modern thought about the general characteristics
of ‘client kings.’ Arguably exceptional cases (especially Parthians) and key issues (especially
succession) are examined in the larger framework of Roman imperialist ideology as well
as, where possible, from kings’ viewpoints. Diﬀerences and changes are seen as variations
on an elastic, but integral theme. That elasticity, enhanced by the language of courtesy, ob-
structs narrowmodern deﬁnition, but crucially explains the success of this Roman imperial
strategy. Tacitus is central to all this. Finally, a new reading of Annals 2. 61 arises from this
and closer consideration of Roman notions of the Red Sea region (“Ethiopia”, India etc.), so
that the passage becomes inconclusive to discussions of the completion-date of the Annals,
on which it has oten been seen as important.
Keywords: Tacitus; Nero; Caucasus; claustra; Egypt; Red Sea.
Der Beitrag widmet sich antiken wie auch zeitgenössischen Überlegungen zu Besonderhei-
ten des ‚Klientelkönigtums‘. Ausnahmefälle (insbesondere die Parther) und grundsätzliche
Fragen (vor allem hinsichtlich der Erbfolge) werden im weiteren Kontext der römischen
Herrschatsideologie und soweit möglich auch aus der Perspektive der Könige untersucht.
Unterschiede und Veränderungen erweisen sich als Varianten eines facettenreichen, aber
grundlegenden Themas. Dieser auch noch durch die höﬁsche Sprache erweiterte Facetten-
reichtum widersetzt sich zwar einer enggefassten modernen Deﬁnition, erklärt aber gleich-
zeitig den Erfolg dieses römischen Herrschatsinstruments. Im Zentrum des Ganzen steht
das Zeugnis des Tacitus. Daraus sowie aus einer näheren Untersuchung römischer Vorstel-
lungen von den Gegenden um das Rote Meer („Ethiopia“, „India“) resultiert schließlich
auch einen neue Lesart von Annales 2,61; daher wird diese Passage auch nicht länger als
beweiskrätiges Argument in den Diskussionen über das Vollendungsdatum der Annales
dienen können, innerhalb derer ihr so ot große Bedeutung zugemessen wurde.
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The purpose of this paper is to look again at the role(s) played by monarchs of various
kinds in the functioning and development of the Roman frontier, with particular refer-
ence to what may be called the ‘far frontier.’ By this designation I mean the rulers who
were demonstrably beyond the power of the Romans in a military sense, but whomight
still be considered (whether by Romans or by modern scholars) as in some sense ‘client
kings.’ In particular, we shall look again at Nero’s expedition into ‘Ethiopia’ to ﬁnd the
source of the Nile, where distant kings played a signiﬁcant role, perhaps even as far as
India. That discussion will shed a rather diﬀerent light on the famously unclear rumi-
nation of Tacitus at Annals 2.61, where Germanicus visits the claustra of Upper Egypt.
Meanwhile, en route we shall also visit the claustra of the Caucasus, to assist with a broad
understanding of Roman dealings with the many diﬀerent client kings (and their deal-
ings with Rome), including the royalty of Parthia.
2 Generalization and the hazards of succession: Roman emperors
and Parthian royals
Already some three decades ago I sought to establish the outlines of what I imagined
as a version of Weber’s Ideal Type, ‘the client king.’ I sought to proceed beyond the
great plethora of variations among diﬀerent rulers across time, place and local circum-
stances in order to generalize in a way that would be analytically useful, especially in
understanding the dilemmas and opportunities encountered by ‘the friendly king’ (as I
preferred to call him and sometimes her) and the strategies and choices he might make.
On reﬂection now (though I certainly did not realize it at the time) my agenda was
rather postcolonialist in that the perspective of the king seemed much more enlighten-
ing than the concerns of Roman power, whether at the center or among Romans closer
to the frontier, not least provincial governors. On the whole the book was well enough
received (its poor production-quality notwithstanding),1 but some critics were troubled
by the fact (certainly true) that diﬀerent rulers did diﬀerent things at diﬀerent times. In
that sense there was a reluctance to consider the generalized experience of ‘the’ client
king, which was the whole point of the exercise.2 Of course, all kinds of diﬀerent actions
and events might occur, but the dynamics of the broad set of relationships remained the
same to an important extent. And that was the nature of the kind of Weberian charac-
terization of client rulers that I sought to elucidate.
1 Typical of early ‘camera-ready copy’ before modern
desktop publishing,
2 E. g. Mitchell 1987.
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There was some discussion also about the appropriateness of the word ‘friendly,’
since it was certainly the case that some of these rulers were not particularly or at all
friendly to Rome in some part of their activities. Of course, at one level we have here
the language of courteous personal and interstate relationships, which was the more
usual mode of imperial diplomacy, however much Romans may have enjoyed stories of
no-nonsense Romans encountering overly sophisticated and mendacious foreigners.3
However, there is also the key reality of the inequality in power and resources which
this language is designed to massage. But the reality was in no way concealed. For it was
very clear to all concerned that some rulers had tiny states, while others had signiﬁcant
forces and other resources at their disposal. These were inequalities between the various
‘friends’ and also between those ‘friends’ and Rome. The point is that it was not gen-
erally in the interests of either Rome or its friendly rulers to harp on such diﬀerences.
The friendly ruler was a very practical feature of Roman imperialism, but it was the
very ﬂuidity of his role that made him most eﬀective. The essence of that role was his
maintenance of basic stability in his realm and his support of Roman interests, whatever
those might be and howsoever they might arise. Among his greatest problems was that
Rome was not a monolith, so that he was all too easily entangled in the internal tra-
vails of Roman political struggles, with which he had at least to be conversant in order
to manage his rather ill-deﬁned ‘friendship’ with the individuals, groups and interests
which constituted the Roman state, whether under the Republic or under the rather
more centralized Principate.
The issue of diﬀerence between friendly rulers is at its sharpest with regard to the
kings of Parthia, whose military potential and resources dwarfed so many other friendly
rulers. Meanwhile, there is certainly something rather awkward in taking these as client
kings or friendly kings when so much of Roman imperialist thought presents them
as the great enemy, the other of the “two great empires.”4 I would suggest, however,
that the issue is not so much whether or not they were in a formal or informal sense
friendly kings, but that their relationship with Rome was more generally idiosyncratic
and peculiar, especially by virtue of their military potential, their history with Rome
and their willingness oten to engage with Rome in constructive diplomacy to mutual
beneﬁt.
We should perhaps recall Plutarch’s formulation of Marius’ peremptory advice to
another such king, Mithridates VI Eupator, “Either try to be more mighty than the Ro-
mans or do what you are told in silence” (Marius, 31). According to Plutarch (broadly
contemporary with Tacitus, be it noted) Marius spoke so bluntly because he wished to
provoke the king to war, while the king was all the more shocked by his ﬁrst experience
3 On the discourse of friendship see Saller 1983. See
also below on Plutarch’s Marius and Cn. Piso.
4 Plin. nat. 5.88: inter duo imperia summa Romanorum
Parthorumque; cf. Matthews 1984, 161.
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of Roman outspokenness (parrhesia) because he had shown all due courtesies and respect
(therapeia and time) to the Roman. The historicity of the moment need not detain us: the
bluntness ascribed to the Roman has its own history in Greek and Roman culture and
the historiography of ancient diplomacy, traceable at least as far back as the response of
Herodotus’ Scythian King Idanthyrsus to the Persian King Darius when the latter de-
manded his subjection.5 The whole problem with Parthia, from a Roman perspective,
was that the scope for diplomatic accommodation coexisted with the awareness on both
sides that in crude military terms Parthia could inﬂict serious harm upon the Roman
Empire, in the east at least. In that sense there was an abiding unclarity about where
superiority lay between the two. On the one hand, the spectacular defeat of Crassus
continued to resonate among Romans long ater, while the occasional Parthian move-
ment through the century or so ater Crassus reminded Romans that Parthia might do
much the same again. On the other hand, however, a Parthian king (Phraates IV) had
returned Crassus’ standards, sent sons and their families to Rome for their ‘education’
and maintained broadly cordial relations.6 Strabo, towards the beginning of the ﬁrst
century AD, opines, with a rather reticent optimism, “the Parthians are all but near to
handing all their power to the Romans” (Strab. 6.4.2).
As Nero’s regime appreciated particularly well, diplomatic accommodation did not
preclude proclamations and celebrations of imperial achievement against the Parthians
or any other power. Nero’s arrangements with the Parthians over Armenia were remark-
able as a solution of the problems presented by that land, but they were not untypical
of the tenor of the relationship between Rome and Parthia that had been set with such
fanfare by Augustus and Tiberius in 20 BC (e. g. R. Gest. div. Aug. 32: the Parthian king,
however, non bello supratus).Meanwhile, the tradition ofNero’s personal fascinationwith
Tiridates exempliﬁes a broader and older anxiety at Rome that emperors might have
rather too much in common with the kings with whom they associated. For kings and
their oﬀspring mixed in Roman society under Republic and Principate alike: Pliny put
their special knowledge to good use, for example, in his account of the geography of
the interior of Asia, where he makes much of the special knowledge he has been able
to gain from “kings sent to Rome from there as suppliants or the children of kings as
obsides.”7 Romans retained a special set of responses to royalty, a full spectrum from pos-
itive to negative.8 Royal engagement in Roman scholarship was no great problem for
the empire and redounded to the king’s credit as a wise ruler: it suﬃces to recall the
work of Juba II, another of Pliny’s sources.9 But there was something uncomfortable
5 Hdt. 4.127; cf. Ballesteros-Pastor 1999.
6 Rose 2005 stresses the second half of this dichotomy.
Cf. Kleiner and Buxton 2008, with substantial
bibliography.
7 Pliny nat. 6.23 with Millar 1982. The Latin obsides
is conventionally translated as ‘hostages,’ but the
term is a poor reﬂection of their position and
signiﬁcance: Braund 1984 ch. 1; Allen 2006.
8 Well captured by Rawson 1975; cf. Erskine 1991.
9 Roller 2003.
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in the potential for royal political inﬂuence at Rome, especially where emperors were
concerned. We may recall the notion that Agrippa I and Antiochus IV, as they were to
become, had taught Caligula to be a tyrant (Cass. Dio 59.24.1: tyrannodidaskaloi). At the
same time, even under the Principate there abided a concern in Roman ideology that the
Roman abroad, in the alien company of foreigners and kings, was not only physically
at risk, but also in moral danger. This was the context for Cn. Piso’s petulant comment
on the splendid banquet that he and Germanicus received from the king of Nabataea,
Aretas IV, where the king bestowed golden crowns on his guests: Piso is said to have
remarked that this banquet was being given for the son of the Roman princeps, not for
the son of the Parthian king (ann. 2. 57).10 The remark suggests that Germanicus was in
danger of becoming like the son of the Parthian king, drawn into eastern ways of luxury
and probably despotism by the disturbing generosity of the Nabataean king. And there
is also the further suggestion that the king himself was more used to hosting Parthian
royalty, a question-mark against his loyalty to Rome.11 When Piso proceeded to throw
away his crown and inveigh at length against luxury, Germanicus tolerated him in part
because this strand of thought had long had a respectable place in Roman ideology.
More speciﬁcally, it was precisely the sense of similarity between a Roman emperor and
a Parthian king that gave force to the notion that the Nabataean king was somehow con-
fusing the two. Accordingly, the Parthian king Vologaeses’ famous concern for the dead
emperor Nero (Suet. Nero 57) may be read as a mark of the emperor’s successful diplo-
macy and high reputation on the eastern frontier, but Romans might also take the view
that Parthian sympathy and mutual understanding were less than entirely creditable to
a princeps.
One of the most startling examples of the sense that the Roman emperor and Par-
thian king shared much in common is to be found in some rather neglected verses of
Statius’ Thebaid, composed c. AD 80–90. At one level we may understand his poetry in
the strong Roman tradition of expressing and even showing empathy with the perspec-
tives and dilemmas of its opponents.12 However, we see here also how much the succes-
sor to the Parthian throne looks like a successor to the princeps of the Roman Empire.
For, in a simile bearing on succession among the bygone Argives, the poet introduces
what can only be a Parthian royal, imagining the dilemmas of a young successor to the
Parthian throne:
sicut Achaemenius solium gentisque paternas excepit si forte puer, cui vivere patrem tu-
tius, incerta formidine gaudia librat, an ﬁdi proceres, ne pugnet vulgus habenis, cui latus
10 Goodyear 1981 ad loc. is probably right to think that
Aretas gave the banquet in the province of Syria.
11 Not without some cause: e. g. Ios. ant. Iud. 18.155.




Euphratae, cui Caspia limina mandet. sumere tunc arcus ipsumque onerare veretur pa-
tris equum, visusque sibi nec sceptra capaci sustentare manu nec adhuc implere tiaram.
(Stat. Theb. 286–293)
Like an Achaemenid taking over the throne and his father’s people, if perhaps
a boy, safer with his father alive: he balances joy with uncertain fear. Would the
elite be loyal? Would the masses chafe at his reins? To whom should he entrust
Euphrates’ ﬂank? To whom the Caspian thresholds? He fears to take up the bow
and set his weight on his father’s horse. In his own mind he is not ﬁt to wield
the sceptre nor yet to ﬁll the tiara.
Roman poets felt able to describe Parthians as Achaemenids, despite (and perhaps also
because of) the consequent ambiguity.13 There is little of that ambiguity here, however,
for reference to the Euphrates and Caspian Gates suits Parthia far better than Persia.
Indeed, this extraordinary passage has been taken to refer to the succession of a particular
Parthian prince, as well it may.14 However, the very fact that it is a simile arising from
succession among Argives invites us to consider its wider relevance. Succession is the
abiding problem, and frequent obsession, of monarchy in all its forms.15 Accordingly,
it is a leitmotiv of the Principate, both in literature and in political reality, so that we
should not ﬁnd it remarkable that events in Parthia oten look so similar to events at
Rome, for example, in the Annals of Tacitus.16 While it is the succession of emperors
that has the greatest impact, the theme of succession reverberates loudly at all levels of
Roman society, embracing wills, legacy hunting, freedom of speech and the rapacity of
emperors, amongst much else.17 Kings regularly seek to arrange their succession, not
least to polish and ensure their own legacy as ﬁne kings. However, within the Roman
ambit, kings were wise to look to Rome, whether in the hope of securing the succession
they desired or, where no more desirable option existed for them, as the best successor
available.18 In Statius’ sketch of the young successor’s anxieties, there is no great sign
of any anxiety about Roman judgments or responses. And yet Rome is not far away.
Elsewhere Statius himself writes of Romans contesting the Caspian Gates, no doubt
primarily the Darial Pass of northern Iberia (silv. 4.4.7), while the Euphrates frontier
could only signal the potential for conﬂict with Rome. Naturally enough, the Roman
writer has nothing to say about Parthia’s dilemmas on other frontiers to its south and
east.
13 OLD s. v. Achaemenius. Note e. g. Stat. Theb. 1.718 on
the Persian-Parthian sun-god.
14 Hollis 1994. It is overlooked by the excellent studies
in Wiesehöfer 1998, though the Achaemenid
associations of Parthia are treated there.
15 Goody 1966; cf. MacGaﬀey 2006 with bibliography.
16 On which, e. g. Ash 1999, raising also the view that
Parthian inadequacies might be held responsible
for Roman degeration, in the absence of a suitably
dangerous opponent.
17 E. g. Millar 1977.
18 Cf. Braund 1983.
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At the same time, however, Statius was surely aware that Rome had played very
substantial roles in the Parthian royal succession in the decades previous to his poetry.
For example, the emperor Claudius had responded to Parthian envoys’ requests and sent
a grandson of Phraates IV, a certain Meherdates, to become Parthian king in place of the
reportedly tyrannical incumbent, Gotarzes. Tacitus has the Parthian envoys refer in the
Senate to their old friendship with the Romans and point out that the Romans should
help their allies, the language of friendly kingship. They were rivals in strength, they
said, but yielded to Rome per reverentiam. They had sent the sons of their kings as obsides
so that they might acquire a better king, accustomed to themores of the emperor and the
senators (ann. 12.10). The diplomatic courtesies were heavily laced with Tacitean irony.
Ater themanner of Statius’ puerMeherdates was young, albeit a iuvenis (ann. 12.11).
And his youth was an issue, we are told, for his inexperience meant that he was easily de-
ceived (ann. 12.12). Tacitus had had Claudius share his wisdom on government with the
youth, homilies whose heavy irony has been well observed: while Claudius’ own rule
hardly qualiﬁed him to dilate on such matters, it was at least unclear that Roman ideals
were appropriate to the ruling traditions of a Parthian king. In any event, Meherdates
did not last long. For he showed himself a true alumnus urbis (as Claudius had called
him, intending to be positive), when, ignoring sound advice from the Roman governor
of Syria, he preferred to enjoy the luxury of Edessa rather than seize the moment to take
power (ann. 12.12). The satirist Juvenal makes a similar point about the ill-eﬀects of the
education of royals at Rome, for all the ﬁne words of the envoys who had come to take
home young Meherdates.19 In the shambolic events that followed, Gotarzes captured
the young man, cut oﬀ his ears and denounced him as a foreigner and a Roman, says
Tacitus: ater all, he probably held Roman citizenship, as friendly rulers of the Princi-
pate usually did, while his upbringing in Rome was no doubt also embraced within the
insults. Tacitus concludes that the living, earless Meherdates demonstrated the clemen-
tia that Gotarzes had been said not to have and, probably more important, constituted
a disgrace for Rome (dehonestamento: ann. 12.14). The historicity of all this is diﬃcult
to assess, though it is worth noting that the frequent discovery of Gotarzes’ coins in
the Caucasus tends to support Tacitus’ passing remark that he was energetic in send-
ing corruptores to spread money to win loyalty. However, it is clear enough that Tacitus
uses the story of Meherdates to show the gulf between imperial intentions (in particu-
lar, that of Claudius) in Rome and the problems in realizing those intentions as fact in
the distant kingdom. As the sardonic author comments, this case illustrates the general
principle, proved by experience, that barbarians preferred to ask for kings from Rome
than to have them: experimentis cognitum est barbarous malle Roma petere reges quam habere
(ann. 12.14).20
19 Iuv. 2.163–165 (and throughout the poem) with
Gowing 1990.
20 Gowing 1990, esp. 321.
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That (though set in a civil war) and Statius’ example illustrate the hazards of suc-
cession from all points of view, including those of the predecessor, the successor, the
kingdom at large and any powers with an interest in the stability of the kingdom. This
was the great weakness of the imperial use of friendly rulers, while it was also a weakness
of the rule of emperors at Rome: as Statius wrote the Thebaid, Domitian had recently
come to power, himself young enough and with thoughts of the Caspian Gates (e. g.
Suet. Dom. 2). Therefore it is hardly surprising that as insightful an historian as Tacitus
perceived the problem of succession among kings, Roman emperors and others besides,
not least in Parthia. In that sense we may indeed see him as critical of central aspects of
the Roman strategy of using such rulers, as has been suggested.21 But, for all that, it is by
no means clear that his accounts of various failures amount to a critique of the system
as a whole, whether in practice or in principle. In Meherdates’ case, for instance, there
were shortcomings aplenty, but Rome had not suﬀered much loss. While the Parthians
had suﬀered bloody civil conﬂict, Rome had lost a Parthian obses, whose primary value
was for deployment in this kind of way. Certainly, Tacitus stresses the blow to Roman
pride and reputation, but that was not the loss of an army: not a single Roman had
died or suﬀered defeat, unless we count Meherdates himself. The entire plan had been a
Parthian one, in which Rome’s role had been simply to deliver Meherdates. There was
no guarantee that, if he had been successful, he would have reigned in Roman interests.
Tacitus liked defeated rulers to die in dignity (ann. 2.63, Maroboduus; cf. Hor. carm. 1.37
for the thought). Meherdates had not.
As Tacitus presumably realized, it was the nature of the system (if we may so term
the use of friendly rulers) that sundry problems would arise. In addition to succession,
many other diﬃculties might emerge: the ruler might need Roman intervention, prove
insuﬃciently obedient, ﬂout Rome’s interest or even go to war against her. With no
doubt there was an instability in friendly kingdoms. To be clear, this is not the kind of
instability currently in vogue among literary critics (including some critics of Tacitus)22
according towhomnothingmeans anything very concrete and all decisions signiﬁcantly
imply the many decisions which were neither taken nor considered, so that authorial
anxiety is everywhere and now the previous fashion for authorial subversion23 seems
itself to be subverted by a trepidation, uncertainty and lack of direction that have more
to do with the modern academic than with even the most timorous of ancient writers.
Rather, it is the instability involved in the holding of power. Clearly such instability was
undesirable, but what was the alternative? It is of course true that from time to time
Rome chose to establish its own direct rule by removing or failing to replace a ruler,
21 Gowing 1990.
22 E. g. Lavan 2011, esp. 294 n. 1, ﬁnding ambiguity
in Tacitus’ view of Agricola; see further below on
slavishness.
23 Note Hine’s scepticism on claims of Senecan
subversion, for example: Hine 2006, 64 and further
below.
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but that option was frequently out of the question, beyond the military strength of the
empire. Frequently too, it was not especially desirable, for friendly rulers were oten a
satisfactory enough choice (or the least bad option at any rate), so that in some areas they
were retained for centuries, as for example in the Crimean Bosporus, where too kings
might proclaim their Achaemenid identity (Tac. ann. 12.18, Mithridates VIII, who lived
on in deﬁance, denying defeat). The whole purpose of friendly rulers was not to hold
for Rome lands that could readily be held by direct rule without cost to Rome, but to
establish a link, a degree of inﬂuence and preferably a measure of control in areas which
were in one way or another diﬃcult, whether by reasons of terrain, location, distance,
local culture and/or the local ability to maintain independence by force if necessary.
As for Parthia, which under the early Principate seems to have presented all these diﬃ-
culties to various extents, Rome remained unwilling and unable to establish any direct
administration there. For when Trajan had his great victory over Parthia, he installed a
friendly ruler. Trajan’s act, rather as Nero’s arrangements with Parthia over Armenia, was
in a strong sense a continuation of long-standing Roman diplomacy in Parthia, though
the military success it expressed certainly oﬀered powerfully to lay the ever-looming
ghost of Crassus.24
3 From Germanicus at the claustra to Nero’s Nubian Nile
All this tends to support those who (rightly) insist that Tacitus’ remarks on Germanicus’
visit to Egypt do not help us much in dating the completion of the early books of the
Annals. The passage has been well discussed by a host of scholars, but it may be worth-
while brieﬂy to draw attention to some aspects of it that bear on the present discussion,
especially as controversy seems to persist.25 Tacitus’ account of Germanicus’ journey up
the Nile, with all its possible associations with earlier journeys there, is replete with
pre-Roman antiquity, including the Spartan origins of Canopus, the activities of Her-
cules, and above all the stunning assertion of King Ramesses’ imperial might at Egyp-
tian Thebes. There Germanicus learns of that king’s empire, which embraced all Asia
Minor and more, including even the Medes, Ethiopians and Scythians. The revenues of
that empire, continues Tacitus, were “no less magniﬁcent than those commanded by the
might of Parthia or Roman power” (ann. 2.60). Once again we see the Roman Empire set
beside the Parthian in a manner that suggests substantial parity between the two great
empires. And once again we see how those empires are readily compared with empires
24 On which, e. g. Sen. nat. 5.18.10.
25 Goodyear 1981, ad loc. has a ﬁne discussion, ob-
serving (contra Lipsius) that if Tacitus wished to
introduce Trajan here, he “bungled the job.” For
Pagán 2012, however, the passage remains decisive,




of the past, whose demisemight be taken as a warning for the future. However, as Tacitus
has it, Germanicus (with his grandfather Antony’s shade never far away)26 was engaged
by other wonders too,27 both man-made and natural, when he came to Elephantine and
Syene:
Exin ventumEjephantinen ac Syenen, claustra olimRomani imperii, quod nunc rubrum
ad mare patescit. (Tac. ann. 2.61)
Then he came to Elephantine and Syene, the bounds once of the Roman Em-
pire, which now lays open to the Red Sea.
Since Lipsius at least there have been attempts to ﬁnd Trajan in this sentence: talk of the
rubrum maremight be taken to refer to the Persian Gulf, at which Trajan famously stood
at the height of his eastern conquests in AD 116, allegedly with disappointed thoughts of
Alexander and India.28 Wemay note, however, that Trajan is nowhere mentioned, while
he is also strikingly absent from the extensive treatments of Parthian aﬀairs throughout
the Annals.29 And also that the rubrum mare, which may refer to the Persian Gulf on
occasion, refers more usually to the Red Sea.30 Unfortunately, Tacitus does not use the
phrase elsewhere, for its appearance at Annals 14.25 must be a manuscript error: there is
a clear nonsense in the idea of sending Hyrcanians to the Red Sea (worse, Persian Gulf)
as a way of getting them back to their homes by the Caspian without being caught by
Parthians.31 Meanwhile, the discovery of the so-called Tabula Siarensis may prompt the
suspicion that the very name of Germanicus evoked thoughts about the limits of empire,
perhaps echoing even to Tacitus’ day, though it is to be stressed that the extant text of
that inscription says nothing that explicitly connects his monuments with such limits.32
There has also been astute consideration of the possible relevance of Roman ac-
tivities in Arabia.33 However, any interpretation of Tacitus’ troublesome phrase must
account for the important fact that Tacitus has here been writing sustainedly about the
situation in Egypt. Arabia, though oten associated with Egypt, has not been at issue at
all in this part of the Annals. Moreover, if he had wanted to whisk his readers suddenly
26 Kraus 2009, 111.
27 On the miracula of Egypt: cf. Sen. nat. 4a.1.1 with
Williams 2008, 229–230.
28 Cass. Dio 68.29.1; cf. Parker 2008, 2001–2003 on
Trajan and India.
29 Woodman 2009, 41.
30 The term (thoroughly discussed by Goodyear ad loc.,
who shows that it most easily means Red Sea here)
may also denote the whole body of water that takes
in both and much the Indian Ocean.
31 Unwittingly demonstrated by Schmitthenner 1979,
102, seeking a route for them that way (Plin. nat.
6.58 does not help). Lipsius’ sui is surely correct:
these were Hyrcanians going to the Hyrcanian Sea,
presumably via the Caucasus.
32 See the interesting remarks of Potter 1987.
33 Goodyear’s preference (Goodyear 1981, 392–393,
with bibliography). The Nabataean kingdom had
been made a province and road-building had en-
sued, not least to the Red Sea: Isaac 1992, 119–121;
Bowersock 1983, 83.
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from Egypt across the Red Sea and Arabia itself to the Persian Gulf, his choice of ex-
pression was uncharacteristically infelicitous. In that event, he would surely have used
Persicum mare or some other form of words to make plain that he did not mean simply
the Red Sea: wemay compare the elder Pliny who does broadly that in describing Arabia
as projecting between two seas, the rubrum and the Persicum (nat. 6.143). In addition it
has also been observed, importantly, that other passages in this part of the Annals do not
make good sense if Trajan had already at the time of composition reached the Persian
Gulf.34
On the other hand, if we take rubrum mare to denote the Red Sea, however closely
demarcated, and not the Persian Gulf we are let with an apparent peculiarity. For the
Roman Empire had stretched to the Red Sea from the moment that Rome took over
the Ptolemaic kingdom.35 Romans were busy in the Red Sea well before Germanicus,
as archaeology and the literary tradition demonstrate, not least in exacting taxes from
trade activities there. An extreme example of one of the consequences is provided by the
elder Pliny, who, as we have seen in other contexts, liked to set his geographical studies
apart from earlier accounts by introducing informants and information with which he
had some personal contact or knowledge. Characteristically, therefore, Pliny tells us of
a delegation sent to Rome under Claudius by the king of Sri Lanka (alias Ceylon alias
Taprobane). As he tells it, the delegation was a consequence of Roman involvement
in taxing goods on the Red Sea, in process already under Augustus and so well before
Germanicus’ visit to the claustra of Egypt.36 The freedman of a tax-farmer named Annius
Plocamus had been blown as far as Sri Lanka, where he had impressed the king. In
particular, the king is said to have observed that the coins in the freedman’s possession
were of a standard weight, despite the fact that their heads indicated that they had been
minted by diﬀerent emperors. In that fact, according to Pliny, the king saw iustitia and so
dispatched a delegation of fourmen to Rome in his eagerness to establish friendship (hoc
maxime sollicitatus ad amicitiam: nat. 6.85). Claudius was then emperor, while Pliny says
that he garnered a great deal of information not only about their own land but about
lands beyond, which he presents to the readers of hisNatural History, information better
than otherwise available (nat 6.84). This is a good example, whatever we think of the
details, of a king taking the initiative in establishing friendshipwithRome.However, the
whole aﬀair and the Augustan involvement in the Red Sea from which it springs, tends
to render Tacitus’ troublesome phrase diﬃcult in another way. For, if Roman imperial
power had stretched to the Red Sea since the death of Cleopatra (one might argue even
before since the Ptolemies were friendly and allied kings, and Cleopatra herself almost
certainly a Roman citizen),37 we are let to wonder which period Tacitus had in mind
34 Goodyear 1981, 389.
35 E. g. Sidebotham 1986.




when he wrote olim as well as to ponder any sense in which Germanicus was not able
to reach or even sail the Red Sea if he had so wished.
Thesematters have generated a vast scholarly bibliography. Certainty on these hoary
questions is impossible and the achievement of wide consensus unlikely. However, given
the sustained focus on Egypt in these chapters and the clear suggestion that the old
claustra of the Roman Empire there are now (nunc) in some sense open to Roman im-
perium, it is surely primarily from a perspective in Egypt that we should consider the
Roman Empire as opening to the Red Sea. Tacitus seems to be suggesting that German-
icus stopped at the claustramarked by Elephantine and Syene, as was appropriate in his
day, but that the imperium Romanum now reaches beyond these old limits to the Red Sea.
The issue is not when and whether the empire reached the Red Sea at all (it had done so
for at least half a century or so before Germanicus), but where the empire now (nunc)
reached that sea. Germanicus had travelled up the Nile and stopped at the claustra. Tac-
itus’ claim, I suggest, is that the empire now (nunc) stretches through and beyond the
claustra on up the Nile to give access to the rubrum mare. And for the extension of Ro-
man power up the Nile we must consider the Roman concern withMeroe and so-called
‘Ethiopia,’ that is the Upper Nile valley of Nubia, and how the rubrum mare could have
featured in that concern.38
Already under Augustus Rome had probed beyond the claustra, but success was very
limited and temporary: Nubians celebrated their victory, so that Germanicuswould have
been unwise to proceed beyond the claustra.39 Of course, the whole issue of Egypt had
been brought into particular vogue by Julius Caesar’s exploits there, the activities of
Antony and above all the Augustan construction of Cleopatra, though the roots of Ro-
man interest in Egypt were deep enough from as early as the third century BC.40 Hence
Germanicus’ desire to tour the region. Under Nero, however, there was a new initiative
on the southern frontier of the province of Egypt, perhaps encouraged by Seneca, who
had a long-standing involvement with the region and later also lands there.41 Nero sent
an expedition through the claustra and on, further up the Nile. This was a mission that
was at once scientiﬁc, diplomatic and military. Our two key texts, the younger Seneca
(nat. 6.8.3) and elder Pliny (nat. 6.181 with 12.19; cf. Cass. Dio 63.8.1–2), oﬀer slight
diﬀerences of detail about this expeditionary force which have caused much trouble to
scholars, to the extent that two such forces have sometimes been imagined, quite un-
necessarily.42 The force was quite small, but made up of praetorians and so in that sense
of some standing (Plin. nat. 6.181). Seneca says that, when the force returned from its
38 The advance of Roman imperium need not entail
annexation of a province, pace Goodyear 1981, 391.
See further below.
39 Burstein 2008 oﬀers an excellent sketch of these
matters, with valuable bibliography; cf. Welsby
1996; Welsby 2001.
40 E.g. De Vos 1980.
41 Well set out by Williams 2008.
42 See Hine 2006, 63, with bibliography, among which
De Nardis 1989 satisﬁes any desire for footnotes in
spades.
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adventures, he heard the report on the mission given to Nero by two centurions, while
Pliny writes that a military tribune commanded the expedition. Conceivably, Seneca’s
memory may have been faulty.43 Otherwise, the report of the centurions suggests that
the tribune did not return to Rome, whether dead (through conﬂict, accident or illness)
or re-deployed elsewhere. Seneca praises the emperor’s commitment to the advance-
ment of knowledge: the emperor is acclaimed as “the greatest lover of truth” (aman-
tissimus veritatis). The expression is echoed by Seneca’s nephew, Lucan, who, prone to
encouraging comparison between Nero and Julius Caesar, has the latter aﬃrm, “But,
though so much virtus dwells in my heart, so great a love of truth, there is nothing I
would rather learn than the origins of the river (Nile), concealed for so many ages, and
its unknown source (caput: cf. Seneca’s ad caput investigandum).” (Lucan. 10.188–191)44
Clearly, discourse about the expedition (involving at the very least Seneca, Lucan and
evidently Nero himself, but probably also a much wider public)45 was couched in terms
of love of truth and the search for the Nile’s head, whatever else might be involved in
the enterprise. In fact there is good reason to think that Nero was rather serious about
matters of science as well as the arts, and every reason to include the Nile expedition
within that interest.46
Meanwhile, as Lucan makes clear, the question of the Nile’s source evoked not only
Caesar but also pharaohs and Alexander himself. For Lucan claims that Alexander had
sent a body of picked men to ﬁnd its source, but they had been beaten back by heat (Lu-
can. 10.270–275): this group recalls Nero’s praetorians well enough. Of course, from the
outset, it had been hoped that Nero’s force would ﬁnd the source of the Nile, and there
was a suggestion that it may have done so, though the expedition had been undone by
the impassable swamps of the Sudd that remain very diﬃcult of passage to the present
day. However, success could be claimed. These swamps might be taken to show further
progress than achieved by Alexander’s picked men, stopped by the desert. And the cen-
turions were able to report about a possible source, as well as the terrain, conditions,
ﬂora and fauna that they had encountered, on which Pliny has a lot to say in conse-
quence. This was all new knowledge, on which Lucan stays silent, presumably avoiding
anachronism but also missing a chance to praise his emperor. However, the centurions
were able also to report on the attitudes they found at Meroe and among other rulers
of the region south of the claustra, who were said to have shown their friendship with
Rome. As Seneca has it, the centurions reported that they had penetrated ad ulteriora
43 See below on his apparent confusion of Philae with
Meroe.
44 Sed, cum tanta meo vivat sub pectore virtus, tantus amor
veri, nihil est quod noscere malim quam ﬂuvii causas per
saecula tanta latentes ignotumque caput. On Nero’s love
of truth, see Montiglio 2006, 577; Hine 2006.
45 As oten, philological attention has limited the
signiﬁcance of the shared language of Seneca and
Lucan to their narrow literary society: Williams
2008, 232. Pliny gives a strong sense of the expe-
dition’s contribution to knowledge, as discussed
below.
46 Further, Hine 2006, 64–67: note especially the
Egyptian dimension of the crepuscular Chaeremon.
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ater being given help by the king of Ethiopia and commendation to the nearest kings
(a rege Aethiopiae instructi auxilio commendatique proximis regibus ad ulteriora penetrassent).
Pliny asserts that there are 45 kings in Ethiopia (nat. 6.186), so that we may understand
why the mission focussed on the proximi. The identity of the King of the Ethiopians
mentioned by Seneca remains unclear, though one might imagine a high king of par-
ticular importance, at least in Roman eyes. There was a special ruler at Meroe, not a
king but a queen, known by the title of Candace. About her Pliny has a little to say:
the expedition must have had contact with her and clearly reported on her (nat. 6.186).
Again we may wonder about the accuracy of Seneca’s recollection. It may well be that
Seneca has misremembered this lady as a king.
Evidently royal attitudes in the region had sotened since the conﬂict with C. Patro-
nius, encouraged by Augustus’ own sot diplomacy47 and no doubt also by the burgeon-
ing prosperity visible in the material record of Nubia through the ﬁrst century AD. That
prosperity is usually explained as a consequence of Nubian exchange and economic me-
diation with Roman Egypt to the north and India, Arabia and the African hinterlands to
the south.48 Seneca, whose knowledge of the Upper Nile had evidently beneﬁted from
the centurions’ report, seems to envisage a trade-route beyond the claustra, along the
Upper Nile through Ethiopia (that is, Nubia) and across desert sands49 to what he calls
the “Indian Sea” (Ab hac Nilus magnus magis quam violentus Aethiopiam harenasque, per quas
iter ad commercia Indici maris est, praelabitur: nat. 4a.2.4). It may be important that Seneca
wrote a work entitled De situ Indiae as well as a discussion of Egypt,50 especially if we see
him as central to the dispatch of the mission up the Nile. Nero’s key courtier had a par-
ticular interest in the broad region, while the geographical tradition about India was so
bound up with that about Ethiopia that in some degree he must also have engaged with
Nubia in these writings. In any case, the interweaving of India and Ethiopia provides an
important context for Roman activities to the south-east, as we shall see.51
This is our ﬁrst glimpse of a rubrum mare beyond the claustra, though Seneca’s dis-
cussion in this section of the Natural Questions is a little undermined by his disquieting
confusion (as it seems) between Philae andMeroe. It is therefore all the more important
that the elder Pliny is so clear in his association between the expedition, Ethiopia and
the Red Sea, though he nowhere speciﬁes that the Red Sea was a particular objective of
the mission, which it may well not have been. For, when Pliny gives the dimensions of
Ethiopia, he explicitly takes Ethiopia and the rubrum mare together as if a unit, though
he does not explain why (nat. 6.196). More important still, he is wholly explicit that
beyond Meroe lies the rubrum mare:
47 Millar 1982, 12.
48 Burstein 2008, esp. 50; cf. Burstein 1998. On India
and Ethiopia, Schneider 2004; Parker 2008 passim.
49 On Ethiopian sands and dust, cf. nat. 1. praef. 9;
3.6.2; 4a.2.1 and 2.18.
50 Plin. nat. 6.60 with Schmitthenner 1979, 102; Parker
2008, 70.
51 See the important study of Schneider 2004.
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All the tract from Meroe is bounded by the Cave-dwellers and the Red Sea,
with a three day journey from Napata to the coast of the Red Sea, on which
route rainwater is conserved for use at some places, a region most fertile and
with gold.
Trogodytis et rubro mari a Meroe tractus omnis superponitur, a Napata tridui itinere ad
rubrum litus, aqua pluvial ad usum conpluribus locis servata, fertilissima regione quae
interest auri. (nat. 6.189)
Napata had a particular signiﬁcance among Romans as the town sacked by the Augus-
tan expedition of the prefect Petronius, whose violence had not taken him at all as far as
Nero’s diplomacy, though he had striven to retain a fortiﬁed position at Primis, well to
the south of Elephantine and Syene (nat. 6.182; cf. 184).52 Strabo, who probably took his
information from Petronius himself, unwittingly underlines the achievement of Nero’s
mission when he explains why Petronius had not pressed on south of Napata – “he
judged that the regions beyond were diﬃcult to travel” (Strab. 17.1.54). Nero’s small
force had made that journey. Moreover, Pliny, though no great admirer of Nero,53 is
very clear that Nero’s mission had been a major advance on Petronius’ under Augustus,
in the sense that it had gone much further and brought back much more information,
which, as far as Pliny was concerned, had ﬁrmly settled a series of disputes, particu-
larly about distances.54 For the Roman military had a strong and very practical concern
with distances between settlements and other key points in the landscape.55 In fact, on
their return Nero’s men seem to have presented their emperor with some kind of map
(Aethiopiae forma, ut diximus, nuper allata Neroni: nat. 12.19).56 For Pliny and a fortiori
for Nero and his regime, earlier Greek and Roman knowledge and achievement in the
geography of the region had been far superseded by the results of Nero’s expedition.
As interest in Egypt and the Nile was key to the dispatch of the expedition, so too
it provided a context for the reception and celebration of its successful outcome. The
Nile and its region were a major theme of Neronian Rome: to the expedition and the
remarks of Seneca and Pliny we may add an account of Egypt by Claudius Balbillus,
its prefect through Nero’s early years. Some governors liked to dilate on the provinces
they had held, but wonder-ﬁlled Egypt and the Nile in particular were especially ripe
52 Strab. 17.1.48–54; cf. Welsby 1998, 1983.
53 Beagon 1992, 191.
54 Nero’s mission might have been judged inferior in
that it seems not to have sacked any town or won
any battle, but Pliny does nothing to encourage that
line of thought.
55 Millar 1982, 16.
56 Rackham’s much-used and very useful Loeb trans-
lation of this textually corrupt passage seems to
take forma here to mean no more than ‘appearance’
or the like, but Pliny’s array of distances and the
rest are consistent with a pictorial image: for forma
… allata, cf. Vitr. 2. praef. 2 (formas adfero). On
schematic military maps, see Millar 1982, 16; cf.




for such treatment.57 Moreover, we must also recall the extraordinary excursus on the
Nile and its sources that occupies a large part of the tenth book of Lucan’s Civil War,
where we see how the Nile readily evoked Alexander, the aforementioned Julius Caesar
and other totemic ﬁgures of the past. In addition to Seneca’s taste for Egypt, the em-
peror’s personal fascination with the region was well known and well criticised among
contemporaries.58 Tacitus reports Nero’s plan to visit Egypt, no doubt encouraged by
the expedition’s success. The idea of such a visit was switly abandoned, according to
Tacitus (ann. 15.36), though a bath was built in Alexandria to receive the emperor, the
undoing of the prefect Caecina Tuscus, who dared to use it (Cass. Dio 63.18.1), so that
we may infer that the visit was not so much cancelled as postponed. Tacitus also tells
us that in AD 65 Nero chose to have the body of his second wife, Poppaea, embalmed
“ater the manner of foreign kings” (regum externorum consuetudine: ann. 16.6), a phrase
of broad application, but which tends to suggest Egyptian practice in particular.59
However, Tacitus is remarkably silent about the expedition up the Nile. That si-
lence resists explanation, though we may note that Tacitus is silent too about Nero’s
similarly-looking mission to trace the amber route towards the Baltic.60 Conceivably,
he remarked on such matters in the context of his (no doubt scorching) treatment of
Nero’s later planned expedition to the Caspia claustra of the Caucasus, the Darial Pass,
evidently also with an eye to Alexander (Suet. Nero 19).61 We may suspect that he pre-
ferred to omit an expedition which, as even Pliny makes clear, brought much credit to
the emperor. Ater all, Tacitus could ﬁnd space for the absurd (as he presents it) search
for Dido’s Carthaginian treasure (ann. 16.1–2.1). However, if Tacitus was silent on the
Nile expedition, Nero’s regime certainly was not. From the ﬁrst years of his reign much
had been made of trivial successes at the frontier, notably in Armenia, well before there
had been anything substantial to crow about. It was only consistent to make the most
of success up the Nile. Accordingly, when Tiridates eventually reached Nero on the bay
of Naples and was entertained with spectacles at Puteoli, Nero’s freedman presented be-
fore him and the public an entire day of “Ethiopians” (Cass. Dio 63.3.1). Men, women
and children featured, at least some apparently in gladiatorial combat. The fact that the
expedition had returned several years or more before Tiridates’ arrival tends to indicate
how much was made of the Nile success,62 for it still resounded and Tiridates could be
shown the reach of the Roman Empire with the expectation that he would be impressed,
57 Sen. nat. 4a.2.13–15 with Williams 2008, 233 on
Balbillus, prefect AD 55–59.
58 Champlin 2003, 174.
59 In detail, Counts 1996.
60 Plin. nat. 37.45 with Hine 2006.
61 Some doubt Nero’s concern with Alexander, for
reasons unclear to me: see Hine 2006, 64 with
bibliography.
62 The Natural Questions was completed c. AD 63,
but the expedition had returned before that date,
presumably while Seneca was still busy at Nero’s
court: further, Williams 2008, 218 n. 4.
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especially as Parthia had neither gained nor lost anything on this frontier, which was for
them relatively unfamiliar and perhaps more than a little exotic.
Gladiatorial combat notwithstanding, the day of Ethiopians displayed to the royal
Parthian also the theme of Roman friendship, the context and particular purpose of his
long journey to Nero. For the Nile expedition had found friendly rulers, it was reported,
who had done what the empire expected of its royal friends in that it had supported the
work of the expedition, a point which ﬁgures prominently in Seneca’s short account of
its reported results. Meanwhile, something could be made of the toponym Philae too,
which though it stood in fact at the claustra, seems to be presented by Seneca as the name
for Meroe, to be translated into Latin as Amicae, whether for reasons of myth or because
this was the boundary between Egypt and Ethiopia where friendship was established.
Did Nero’s regime claim that Meroe was friendly even in its name, either in the display
at Puteoli or in some other context?63 Possibly, but there was more pageantry to be had
in themythical associations of Ethiopia. Pliny’s references to these oﬀer substantial clues
about the ways in which a whole day of Ethiopians might have been given some vari-
ety and zest. For Pliny mentions the eponymous Aethiops himself, the son of Vulcan,
appropriate to the famous heat of the Ethiopia that took his name (nat. 6.187). Also the
famous Memnon, whose Egyptian statue had fascinated Germanicus, might well have
been put on show. Pliny mentions him as part of the great Ethiopian past, with which
he connects even Andromeda (nat. 6.182), who may therefore also have appeared in the
long show at Puteoli. She linked Ethiopia with Syria, a region of special interest for
a Parthian set on the rule of Armenia. In addition, much might be made of sun, sand
and, above all surely, the Nile itself, whether as a river, as a masculine river-deity or both.
Presumably the river-god appeared in all his power and fecundity, presented as the sup-
porter and ally of the expedition.64 Exotic creatures – crocodiles, hippopotamus and the
rest – were surely de rigeur in such a pageant, perhaps with ebony trees and other ﬂora
(Pompey had shown them: nat. 12. 19). Pliny holds forth on the various physical pecu-
liarities of the inhabitants of these lands too, whichmight have been represented during
the day, with or without claims to their scientiﬁc signiﬁcance, such as Pliny implies (nat.
6.187–188). However, Pliny is interestingly sceptical about the reality of pygmies at the
Nile’s source. The source itself must have appeared in some form, though Pliny’s appar-
ent scepticism leaves a measure of doubt as to whether pygmies featured in any way. He
is much surer about the use of red clay as body-covering, despite his misunderstanding
of the practice as the result of local shame about having black skin (nat. 6.190), so that
this very visual phenomenon may have been included in the pageantry too. There was a
danger of monotony in devoting a whole day to Ethiopians, but Pliny’s hints are enough
63 The extant sources on this are ﬂimsy enough
(Williams 2008, 232), but there was a potential to
be exploited in this etymology.




to show the potential variety of themes and images available to make up the show. At
all costs the day had to be both striking and engaging, as also the rest of the festivities,
for Tiridates had only just arrived and this was the moment to impress him.
We may be very sure that the celebration of Ethiopia went far beyond the day at
Puteoli, both before and ater. True, the expedition had been no stunning conquest.
But a probing military expedition on so famous and evocative a quest was campaign
enough for a Neronian celebration of the military success that the youthful emperor
badly needed. As well as myth, exotica and combat, the show at Puteoli may have re-
enacted scenes from the expedition in suitably martial terms. However, ultimately, it
was Tiridates himself and the great agreement over Armenia that would overshadow
Nero’s Ethiopian campaign, albeit not quite yet and not entirely. For the success was
made important enough to be registered, if not by Tacitus or by Suetonius, whose prior-
ities were elsewhere. Pliny is clear that the scientiﬁc expedition had a military intent, as
also is Cassius Dio: exploration and imperialism are familiar bedfellows.65 And had not
Nero found the source of the Nile, solving the famous old problem that had intrigued
Alexander, Caesar and others? It was easy to say so. While Seneca praised Nero’s love of
truth, he could also draw a ﬂattering comparison with Persian Cambyses, yet another
glance at past empires.66 For crazed Cambyses had made the mistake of launching an
Ethiopian expedition in ignorance of the land and conditions there, but wise young
Nero had sent a special unit to assess the situation as best could be done, with resulting
success to proclaim. It is not hard to see why Nero’s freedman considered it appropriate
to set before the royal Parthian a day of Ethiopians, showing Neronian imperial success
at a distant frontier, where Persian Cambyses had failed so spectacularly. No doubt the
Ethiopians’ association with the sun (e. g. Lucan. 10.307) did nothing to deter him: both
Tiridates and Nero were committed to a sun deity, whether Helius-Apollo or Mithras, as
their staged rituals in the Roman Forummade very plain.67 And in fairness Nero’s small
expeditionary force had real achievements to claim. For, as we have seen, it was to its dis-
coveries that Pliny turned for his account of the Nubian Nile, as earlier had the partial
Seneca. And there was a real value in strengthening friendly relations with the rulers of
the region beyond the claustra, especially in view of the unsatisfactory outcome of hos-
tilities under Augustus. Meanwhile, all this illustrates well enough the aforementioned
value of friendly rulers to Rome: the instability of the contacts that were strengthened
and forged by Nero’s Nubian expedition was a small downside that had to be toler-
ated when the upside of these connections was so clear and no better option existed for
Rome.
65 As Hine 2006, 63 appreciates.
66 Sen. de ira 3.20.1: non prouisis commeatibus, non
exploratis itineribus. Cf. Lucan. 10.280.
67 Champlin 2003, 221–229.
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It should not surprise us to ﬁnd that Cassius Dio oﬀers an account of Nero’s Nile ex-
pedition in distinctly negative terms (Cass. Dio 63.8.1). Such is the tenor of his treatment
of Nero and his regime as a whole. It is to be expected that the expedition’s achieve-
ments would be rubbished by Nero’s more determined critics. And so it is. For Dio
brings together the Nile expedition and the later plan to campaign at the Caspian Gates
as examples of the same process, throwing in alleged rancour with Parthian Vologae-
ses too. Dio’s claim is that Nero hatched these ambitious schemes to north and south
only to abandon them when his scouts reported that these projects required time and
trouble. Suddenly, the ambitious emperor was satisﬁed instead with the hope that these
regions would come under Roman control on their own (automata). It was easy to be
critical about a preference for diplomacy over war, especially as Nero set oﬀ instead (as
Dio presents the matter) for his scandalously unmilitary ‘campaign’ of performance in
Greece. In all this, Dio shows scant concern for chronology. By bringing these matters
together his aim of course was to damnNero’s alleged combination of caprice and pusil-
lanimity, rather as Tacitus suggests, for example, in his account of the emperor’s aborted
trip to Egypt. However, the two projects did have something important in common
which may actually have featured in Nero’s politics and in more positive accounts of his
reign. Both plans concerned famous claustra. It may well be that Nero himself brought
them together as examples of his desire and ability to extend Roman power. Ater all,
Claudius had made much of his extension of the empire to Britain, a much-celebrated
leitmotiv of his reign wherein breaking open the bounds of the natural barrier of Ocean
had been a central conceit.68 Nero could not claim to have created a new province, but
he could claim with some justice to have addressed these two claustra at other points
of the compass than Britain in the west. Events in the Caucasus remain murky, though
Flavian concerns with the claustra there indicate a problem, in which the Alani certainly
played a part.69 To the south, as we have seen, it was easy for Nero to claim success. His
expedition had probed deep and local rulers had shown their friendship. Whether or
not there was any claim that they had been cowed by Nero’s greatness, it could be pro-
claimed that new Ethiopian obedience made a ﬁghting war there both unnecessary and
unwise.
It remains unclear how far the sea passage to India mentioned by Seneca was im-
portant to Nero’s expedition. Neither Seneca’s brief mention of the centurions’ report
nor Pliny’s disquisition on the nature of the Upper Nile have anything to say about the
relevance of notions of India to the dispatch of the expedition. However, the manner
of their accounts did not require it. Seneca says simply that they were sent ad investi-
gandum caput Nili,70 which might or might not entail information about a passage to
68 Braund 1996b; Clarke 2001.
69 I have explored this in Braund 1994.




India. However, the fact that Seneca elsewhere linked the Nubian Nile with sea-passage
towards India tends to suggest that thoughts of India had at least some role in the expe-
dition’s dispatch.71 At least we may be sure that in celebrating the expedition’s success
Nero and his regime made the most of its signiﬁcance, so that there was every reason to
bring forth notions of the rubrum mare and India. Roman emperors had been thinking
about India for a long time: Augustus himself had boasted of the royal delegations that
“were oten sent to me from India, not seen before with any Roman leader” (R. Gest. div.
Aug. 31.1). We are let to speculate about the parts of India from which all these royal
emissaries had come.
None of this is to suggest that Tacitus alludes to Nero’s expedition at Annals 2.61.
Since he does notmention it in his extant account of Nero, it would be rather perverse to
imagine that he alludes to it so obliquely when describing the activities of Germanicus,
despite the fact that Germanicus was Nero’s grandfather (another possible incitement
for Nero’s expedition). Tacitus’ point seems to be rather that Rome has advanced its
reach beyond the claustra where Germanicus had stopped, now stretching beyond as
far as the rubrum mare. His choice of vocabulary suggests the opening (patescit) of what
had been closed (claustra).72 Translation into English tends to obscure or remove the
evocations of the Latin words which Tacitus has chosen to use here. However, it must
be stressed that patescere, usually translated in such contexts as ‘to reach’ or the like, is
close to patere and strongly evokes opening. Meanwhile, claustra, though regularly and
reasonably translated into English as ‘Gates’ strongly evokes the verb claudere to which
it is related. Claustra might be places where passage is possible, but the basic meaning
of the word is ‘bolts’: these are places where space is restricted or closed completely.
Through this vocabulary Tacitus is seeking to communicate to his readers the sense that
Rome has opened the barriers at Elephantine and Syene and, via ‘Ethiopia,’ has opened
Roman power onto the rubrum mare not simply along the eastern coast of Egypt but
much further south and east, even towards India. For their part Roman readers would
have been well prepared for such a discourse of opening what had been closed. We
have noticed how Claudius used the idea in his crossing to Britain. The same idea was
used again by Tacitus to describe Agricola’s exploits to the north of the island, where he
“opened up new peoples” (Agr. 22). The sense of opening was both scientiﬁc exploration
andmilitary conquest, embodying the claim that among the positive beneﬁts of Roman
military activity was its ability to open up the world not only for the empire, but for
humanity and civilization at large.73
71 India and Ethiopia are linked again at nat. 5.18.2;
Schneider 2004.
72 As noted by Goodyear 1981, 391, with bibliography
and parallel usages, but he does not see the signiﬁ-
cance of that fact.
73 Clarke 2001, esp. 100, with Braund 1996b, chapters
1 and 9.
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Conﬁdent Roman imperialism was at odds with claustra, for they were the instru-
ments of defence, obstruction and closure, and so were inimical to the conception of
Rome’s imperialism as the facilitation of access, scientiﬁc knowledge and Roman mili-
tary control. The elder Pliny’s account of the Caspian Gates of the Darial Pass (which he
alone insists on calling the “Caucasian Gates”) illustrates their defensive obstructiveness
very well:
… a huge work of Nature, with mountains suddenly split apart, where doors
have been ﬁtted with beams reinforced with iron, beneath the centre of which
ﬂows a river of ghastly odour. On a rock has been dug a fortress named
Cumania, built to fend oﬀ the passage of innumerable peoples. There, at this
place, the world is separated by gates (terrarium orbe portis discluso). Directly
opposite stands the Iberian town of Hermastus. From the Caucasian Gates
through the Gurdinian mountains the Valli and the Suani, unconquered peo-
ples, dig gold-mines. From these to the Black Sea are very many types of He-
niochi and then of Achaei. That is the situation at one of the most famous
locations on earth. (nat. 6.30; cf. Strab. 6.4.2)
In essence, Pliny’s description is accurate enough, except that it fails to make clear that a
diﬃcult road overmany kilometres lies between the fortress of Cumania (whose remains
are identiﬁed on a hill close above the let bank of theRiver Terek) andHermastus, which
must be Harmozica (alias Armazistsikhe). This is a fortiﬁed conical hill which faces the
end of the route down from the mountains across the River Mtkvari (the ancient river
Cyrus), an acropolis for the ancient capital at Mtskheta, situated at the end of that route
and north of theMtkvari. However, there is an element of imagination too, stressing the
nature of the obstacle. The River Terek runs clean and odourless, while the great barred
doors have yet to be established archaeologically and may well be invention. There was
every reason for Pliny to have his geography right. Under Nero Corbulo’s mapping in
Armenia had taken in the place. Pliny knew that, for he complains idiosyncratically that
the term “Caspian Gates” was used, wrongly as he insists (cf. nat. 6.40). The chance dis-
covery of an inscription in the region of Harmozica also shows us that under Vespasian
Roman military engineers were at work in Iberia strengthening walls: the inscription is
dated to AD 75, two years before Pliny completed his work in AD 77 (SEG 20.112). As
Statius has already shown us, the Flavian regimewas concerned about theCaspia claustra,
as he more conventionally calls them.
A key feature of Pliny’s account which is easily overlooked, however, is his treat-
ment of the peoples of the region. On the Roman side of the claustra are the Iberians,
by now an established friendly kingdom, Roman ally enough since Pompey, albeit not
without incident. To the west, the peoples are unconquered (indomitae gentes), numer-
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ous and fragmented (plurima genera) with names that recall Greek traditions of horrors
there, though they are not a direct threat in Pliny’s vision of the region. The problem,
on his view, lies to the north, from where countless peoples (innumerae gentes) wish to
cross southwards. Pliny doubtless knew that they had on occasionmanaged to cross with
terrible consequences: only very recently Tiridates, now ruling in Armenia, had almost
lost his life through such an incursion (Ios. bell. Iud. 7.7.4). It is the sheer weight of num-
bers that deﬁes control. The fortiﬁcations at Cumania are the principal line of defence
for the empire, so that where these claustra are concerned, the key issue is not their ob-
struction of Roman imperialism but their blockage of would-be invaders from outside.
For Rome seems never seriously to have envisaged movement north of the Darial Pass
onto the vast North Caucasian Foreland: there was nothing much to gain there. Both
Rome and Parthia, separately and together, needed to defend here, but seem not to have
considered (surely rightly) that the best form of defence might be attack. By contrast,
as we have seen, expansion beyond Elephantine and Syene into Nubia was far more at-
tractive for material, ideological and military reasons, which is why Rome was already
probing in that direction under Augustus, why Nero sent his expedition and, on the
present argument, why Tacitus alluded generally to Roman advancement there.
This substantial contrast between the two diﬀerent claustra demonstrates clearly
enough not all claustrawere the same. However, wemay also observe substantial similar-
ities, prominent among which are the extraordinary numbers of peoples and kings who
are said to have been involved at and around these key locations. Beyond the claustra of
Upper Egypt we have seen no less than 45 kings, as well as Candace and (if he is not an
error for Candace) a high king of some kind. Beyond the Darial claustra we have seen
peoples who are simply countless, not to mention other numerous peoples of the area
and of course the king of Iberia. Indeed there is every likelihood that the Caucasus and
the steppe to its north could muster at least as many kings as the 45 or so of Nubia.
Quite apart from the various kinglets of the western Caucasus listed in Arrian’s Periplus,
we have a series of names inscribed on artefacts, each of which presents a challenge of
identiﬁcation. Among older ﬁnds, there is Flavius Dades, found on a silver dish found in
a burial close to Harmozica. Among more recent discoveries, in addition to our grow-
ing understanding of the Iberian elite, we must somehow locate Queen Ulpia Naxia,
her seal-ring, sporting panthers as its hoop and her portrait and inscription on its face
(Fig. 1), was found in a rich burial from the centre of Mtskheta.74 Should we understand
her to be an Iberian or is she a member of the burgeoning royal society of the Caucasus
beyond?75 The burial, possibly hers, was deposited in the later second century AD, while
her nomen encourages a dating of that kind. There is little to be gained by speculating
74 I am grateful to Guram Qipiani and the Georgian
National Museum for access and permission; also to
Sean Goddard for the drawing.
75 Further, Braund, Nemsadze, and Javakhishvili 2010.
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Fig. 1 Signet ring of Queen
Ulpia Naxia.
about her acquisition of the name Ulpia and presumably Roman citizenship derived
from Trajan, but we do well to note that an Iberian prince died for Trajan, probably at
Nisibis. His verse epitaph mentions Seleucus Nicator, perhaps claimed also as an ances-
tor, and – most important for the present discussion – it identiﬁes the Iberian kingdom
as situated “by the Caspian claustra.”76 Pliny alludes to that location’s enormous fame
in the world, so we may well understand why the epitaph of an Iberian royal who died
far away might situate his homeland according to this greatest of landmarks, with all its
associations.
Each of these two claustra had its mass of rulers beyond and beside. In both regions,
it was busy Roman diplomacy with these many authorities (albeit with their own in-
ternal hierarchies and alliances, no doubt) that made the claustra viable as strongpoints,
whether for defence or for advancing beyond. The challenge for Roman government
was enormous, so that while large decisions might be referred to the emperor, much
diplomacy was let in the hands of local governors and other friendly kings. For in addi-
tion to all the problems that might attend the larger kingdoms, which we have already
outlined, there was the sheer number of diﬀerent rulers, each with their own agendas,
traditions and no doubt resentments. It has been well observed that the Roman Em-
pire had an easier task on its eastern frontier than its western to the extent that the for-
mer meant one substantial authority (under the Principate, Parthia) with which agree-
ments could be made and hopefully kept, while to the west in Britain and Germany
there was a plethora of diﬀerent rulers, many with positions far less stable than, say,
the Parthian throne. However, that general dichotomy requires modiﬁcation insofar as
there was much of the east that even Parthia could not control adequately. At the claustra
of the north and the south there was a dizzying need for diplomacy, so that the model
76 IGR 1.192 = IGUR 1151.
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of client kingship continued to ﬂourish in all its complexity both in the Caucasus and
in Nubia.
Augustus in the Res Gestae encapsulates an imperialist ideal which he claims to have
achieved: “The borders (ﬁnes) of all the provinces of the Roman people whose neigh-
bouring peoples did not obey our imperial command (imperium), I increased.”77 How-
ever, as usual with the various excerpts from ancient texts which modern scholars roll
out to support one view or another on Roman imperialism and frontier-ideology, the
assertion requires close consideration that may seem to muddy his pellucid assertion.
For a start, what did ‘obey’ mean? To ask that simple question is immediately to reveal a
wide and complex spectrum of possible scenarios. For example, if the foreigner broadly
followed Roman priorities, was that obedience enough? If, for special reasons, the for-
eigner acted in a way that did not suit Rome, or even against Rome, was that to be
tolerated provided that in general or in future he was considered to be more Rome’s
friend than her enemy? And which Rome was to be obeyed – the general at hand, his
competitors in Rome, the emperor’s ﬁnancial oﬃcers, the emperor’s advisers or (if he
were to be troubled) the emperor himself? One could go on with such questions, but
even these few illustrate the vitally important fact that it was not a simple matter either
for Rome to insist on obedience or for others to deliver it.
And yet there is an ideological power in simplistic formulations of such desper-
ately complex dilemmas. Plutarch’s Marius showed us one simple mode of dealing with
the foreigner, in which the blunt and brutal demand for obedience was central and ex-
plicit. And as with Augustus’ expression, the alternative to obedience was war: Rome
(or rather, this image of Marius) oﬀered a simple black-and-white choice. For, as we
saw, direct and commanding Roman behaviour of this kind suited a principal strand of
Roman ideology: it was right and good for Romans to “war down the proud” as Augus-
tan Virgil had Jupiter express part of Rome’s mission (debellare superbos: Aen. 853). But,
for all the ideological power of such stances, it remained to deal with the realities of
complex situations at the frontiers. There were limits even to Roman military capacity,
as the occasional great disaster served to demonstrate very clearly, even if explanations
could be spun to shit analysis of their causes away from the fact of those limits onto
the shortcomings of individual Roman generals, a Crassus or a Varus. The military re-
ality was that, strong and resource-rich as it was, neither Rome nor any other empire
could combine, along all its frontiers, the blunt demand and enforcement of total obe-
dience with active warfare in its absence. Of course, diplomacy did not work in that
way: Plutarch’s Marius is an extreme, bent on creating war. In reading Augustus’ words
in the Res Gestae, quoted above, scholars tend to follow his emphasis on the extension of
77 omnium provinciarum populi Romani, quibus ﬁnitimae
fuerunt gentes, quae non parerent imperio nostro, ﬁnes
auxi: R. Gest. div. Aug. 26.1.
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provincial territory, the successful imposition of war in the face of disobedience. How-
ever, his words are no less and probably more true when they are read in the way that
he does not encourage quite so much. For he asserts not only war but also the success
of his diplomacy, which features very prominently in this inscription as in the reality of
empire. Of course, glory was traditionally to be had in war, but there was also glory to
be had in diplomacy, at least because that too tended to suggest the military success and
potential which underpinned and facilitated so much of diplomacy.
For, as we sawwithNero and theNile expedition, there weremanyways in which an
emperor could turn practical diplomacy into military and other renown. Accordingly,
soon ater in the Res Gestae, Augustus presents his appointment of a king to replace the
dead king of Armenia with another king as a major act of traditionalism, with which
Tiberius is also involved to his glory. The emperor insists that he could have made Ar-
menia a province, but preferred to follow the traditional path of client kingship (R. Gest.
div. Aug. 27.2:…malui maiorum nostrorum exemplo…). Of course he does not explain that
preference in this case nor set out all the problems of annexation, not least the conse-
quences to be expected from the Parthians. Instead he seeks to validate it by setting out
the genealogy of his new nominee, grandson of the Tigranes whom Pompey had let to
rule there. Discussing the passage, Brunt and Moore rightly note that the emperor gives
little indication of the upheavals that followed from his ‘preference,’ but then seem to
suggest that he had a viable alternative, with which it is not easy to agree.78 However,
my point here is not to explore the many ways in which Augustus presents himself in
the best light in the Res Gestae (a long and otiose task), but rather to use that tendency to
show how grand notions of Roman imperial activity could coexist comfortably enough
with the messy realities of the busy diplomacy upon which the imperial frontiers de-
pended, whether for their security or for their extension.
It follows that we should not be too occupied by the apparent inconcinnities and
inconsistencies in the various statements and suggestions of diﬀerent Romans about
the frontiers of the Roman Empire, upon whose resolution so much scholarly eﬀort is
expended. For not only do our various ‘sources’ (the reductionist common term does
not help) have their own angles of vision and intention, like Augustus in his famous
inscription, but – perhaps even more important – they are dealing with issues which
are contested, dynamic and contestable. Why should one expect Romans to agree at all
about the nature of the imperial frontiers? It is to be expected that broad tendencies
are visible in Roman thought on the subject over time, for example the tendency for
Roman emphasis to move rather away from war and expansion and towards the virtues
of military conservatism and defence that is visible throughmuch of the second century
AD. However, the tension between those two general options – territorial expansion or
78 Brunt and Moore 1967, 72, noting Antony’s exam-
ple, which Augustus too may have had in mind.
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maintenance of the status quo – had been part of Roman thinking for as long as we can
explore it. Under the Republic, where too greed and glory did not require the extension
or creation of provinces, there was regular controversy and hesitation for example, about
how to respond to bequests of kingdoms, caused not only by the rivalries of power
politics but also by the very issue of imperial expansion and the acquisition of further
territory and its associated consequences.79 Moreover, it is the same abiding issue that
sets the context both for Augustan expansionism and for his very diﬀerent ﬁnal advice,
having set out in writing a tally of the empire’s resources, that the empire should be kept
within its boundaries, not expanded.80 In his usual sardonic manner, Tacitus adds that it
was unclear whether he gave this advice through fear or through envy (of his successor’s
own potential achievements): incertummetu an per invidiam. Certainly, no-one could read
the mind of the dead Augustus, though Tiberius will have had his own ideas. The main
point here, however, is not to speculate about Augustus’motives in giving this advice but
to locate that kind of advice within the history of Roman imperialism, as an on-going
option debated through the Republic and Principate. The more conservative option
may have been to the fore under Hadrian, for example, but the matter was by no means
settled as we see not only with Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, but still more clearly
with the expansionist tendencies of Septimius Severus.
4 Augustan initiatives
With all that in mind we may return to the Nile and the Darial Pass and to friendly
kings there and elsewhere. In the Res Gestae Augustus proclaims sterling success in Nu-
bia, which he pairs with Aelius Gallus’ contemporary success in Arabia and so makes
the image of success there still greater. He insists that these successes had been achieved
under his leadership and auspices: in each land huge numbers of hostile locals had been
killed and several towns captured. In Ethiopia, he speciﬁes, his army had penetrated as
far as the town of Napata (here, Nabata), next to which is Meroe (R. Gest. div. Aug. 26.5).
Evidently, Meroe already had a signiﬁcant reputation, perhaps not only because it had
been the seat of Petronius’ principal opponent, the Candace of his day. However, the
grandeur of Augustus’ assertions of great victories and a probe into Ethiopia which may
well also have encouraged Nero’s mission, was a positive presentation of a messier real-
ity. For Strabo describes an ebb and ﬂow of conﬂict towards Ethiopia. According to his
well-informed account, Gallus’ use of troops from the Roman forces in Egypt had pre-
cipitated trouble there. As we have observed, even Rome could not ﬁght on all fronts at
79 On bequests, Braund 1983. 80 Tac. ann. 1.11: consilium coercendi intra terminos
imperii.
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the same time. The Ethiopians had a local grievance with the nomarchs, which is not ex-
plained but no doubt involves ﬁnancial demands. Petronius’ ﬁrst military response had
been successful enough, but a second was soon needed, during which he reached and
sackedNapata.However, as we have seen, he did notwant to attempt any further advance
south, daunted by the terrain. These conﬂicts were not settled by his military actions,
especially as he had not in fact reached Meroe, as Augustus admits in his inscription,
though the emperor tries to suggest that Petronius somehow came close enough. Peace
was restored to the region only ater the orefect arranged for an ‘Ethiopian’ delegation
to visit Augustus. Their willingness to make the journey was doubtless improved by the
fact that he was at the time not in Rome but on the island of Samos. Strabo’s account of
the agreement there (17.1.54) indicates that the ‘Ethiopians’ achieved a great deal at this
meeting. This seems to have been a new beginning in Roman relations with ‘Ethiopia,’
for when Petronius had responded to their diplomatic eﬀorts by telling them to go to
Caesar, they had claimed not to knowwho he was or where hemight be found. Hitherto
their dealings with Rome had apparently been interactions with authorities in Egypt,
nomarchs and possibly the prefect. Of course, Egypt had been a Roman province for
only some ten years, but even so their apparent ignorance (if it is not taken as disingen-
uousness) is noteworthy. On Samos, says Strabo, they got everything they wanted from
Augustus, who even remitted the payments he had imposed upon them. The nature of
those payments remains obscure, perhaps linked to their displeasure with the nomarchs
or possibly reparations which the emperor had initially demanded. Nor, more generally,
is it at all clear how much of this all aﬀair arose from the Nubian population resident
north of Syene and Elephantine.81
Meanwhile, we must note a potentially very important ‘coincidence.’ It was also to
Augustus on Samos that an Indian delegation came and established friendship, to the
emperor’s evident delight, for at least one of the envoys travelled with him to Athens
(Cass. Dio 54.9.8–10, noting earlier contact too). An Indian entourage was all the more
exotic because, as Trajan’s musings at the Persian Gulf show, thoughts of empire in In-
dia tended to evoke also Alexander. Of course, it might be mere chance that this Indian
mission happened to travel to Augustus on Samos around the very time that the Nu-
bians arrived there, for Dio indicates that many envoys made similar journeys. How-
ever, we must at least consider the possibility that the two embassies were in some sense
connected, though we do not know how that might have come about or the precise se-
quence of events. If, as suggested above, Nero’s Nubian expedition had been encouraged
by notions of the Red Sea and India (not least Seneca’s), we can only wonder whether
the arrival of these two delegations before Augustus at more or less the same time was
the consequence of Roman diplomatic activity beyond the claustra and/or communica-
tion between theNubians and their neighbours far across the sea. If that is right, Tacitus’
81 On them, Adams 1983.
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troublesome remark that introduces Roman expansion towards the rubrum mare into a
narrative about Germanicus at the claustra would be a little less out of place: Augustus
had already been thinking in that direction.82
The outcome of all this was that both sides could claim a victory for themselves,
as did Augustus in the Res Gestae. He did not need to dwell on the military setbacks
his forces had suﬀered or the diplomatic concessions he had agreed on Samos, about
which even Strabo is noticeably vague. However, thanks to Strabo, we can start to see
themessy realities of frontier relationships that lay beneath loty Roman talk of demand-
ing obedience and warring down the proud. These are the inconsistencies and discon-
tinuities that emerge when we bring together diﬀerent authorial agendas, perspectives
and discourses. Scholars may seek to argue that one formulation is better or truer than
the other, but the more important observation surely is that they exist side-by-side and,
however we choose to judge them, each has its own kind of validity. Meanwhile, in
postcolonialist vein, we have for once some insight into the perspective(s) of the other
side, the ‘Ethiopians.’ Caution is required in view of our limited grasp of the available
Meroitic evidence, but it seems that among the ‘Ethiopians’ too there was the celebra-
tion of victory.83 Understandably so, for even Strabo’s account from the Roman side
makes clear that they had inﬂicted serious blows upon the Romans. They had actually
captured Syene, Elephantine and Philae, the famous claustra, early in the conﬂict, en-
slaving their inhabitants and dismantling Augustus’ statues (while apparently ignorant
of his identity). They had also made an agreement on Samos which, as Strabo puts it,
gave them everything they wanted. Although they had suﬀered setbacks too, Meroe it-
self was unscathed and the Roman military had done damage only at the frontier. No
doubt the fact that both sides could claim success contributed to the stability that seems
to have ensued down to and beyond Nero’s day. Finally, Strabo’s account tends also to
indicate that Augustus’ celebration of his success here had already taken some of the
course that Nero was to follow in the display at Puteoli and elsewhere. For Petronius
had sent 1 000 ‘Ethiopian’ captives to the emperor in Rome, where excuse must have
been found to display them to the Roman public, though many of these may have been
repatriated under the subsequent agreement on Samos. We may wonder whether Au-
gustus too had had an ‘Ethiopian day,’ and indeed whether any of those who appeared
before Nero and Tiridates had been brought back by the Nile expedition as slaves or
delegates. Like Nero too, Augustus’ regime had invoked the famous debacle of Camby-
ses: Strabo says that Petronius successfully traversed the area where Cambyses’ army had
been overwhelmed. And, as both Strabo and the Res gestae indicate, there was already
much talk of Candace, Meroe, Napata and other places and distances (as Pliny conﬁrms:
82 Note too Germanicus and the Persian Gulf (fur-
ther, below): Cantineau 1931; cf. Matthews 1984,
165–166; Potter 1991; Gawlikowski 1998.
83 Burstein 2008.
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nat. 6.35) in Augustan Rome. These unfamiliar names and places served to evoke under
Augustus the reach of imperial power and inﬂuence that Nero was to develop further
with his expedition to the source of the Nile, emulating all that Augustus had achieved
there. Nero’s expedition had been an innovation, but, as oten at Rome, closer exami-
nation shows that the innovation stood within a tradition, including not only Persians
and Greeks but also the paradigmatic Roman princeps himself.84
Meanwhile, Augustus gives us also a rare glimpse of activities at the Darial Pass,
though it is no more than the slightest of glimpses:
Our friendship was sought, through envoys, by the kings of the Bastarnae,
Scythians and Sarmatians who are on this side of the River Tanais and on the
far side, also the king of the Albanians, Iberians and Medes. (R. Gest. div. Aug.
31.2)
Pompey’s campaigns and celebrations had made these names less unfamiliar, so that
Augustus’ more jubilant tone on envoys from India, immediately prior to these words,
is understandable enough: these were a ﬁrst and were clearly a remarkable sight to be-
hold (Strab. 15.1.73). However, these regions too were exotic enough in his day, while
events in the Caucasus could have consequences for his arrangements in Armenia, about
which he had rather more to say. Hence his active diplomacy, though he represents these
eﬀorts as the initiative of foreigners who come to him.Wemaywonder, even so, whether
any of these asked the question posed by the ‘Ethiopians’ to Petronius and presumably
also to the freedman by the king of Sri Lanka, namely who is he and where can we ﬁnd
him? But Augustus’ account gives no hint of such questions: they come to him because
they desire his and Roman friendship, so that their very coming from obscure and dis-
tant lands is an index of the greatness of the emperor and Rome alike. We should have
expected the major kings of the Caucasus (of Iberia, Albania and Media Atropatene),
whose delegations are named as a cluster, a little apart from the others. Much more in-
teresting is this indication of Roman diplomacy in the interior of the north coast of the
Black Sea and, most important for the present discussion, with Sarmatians east of the
Tanais, that is on the North Caucasian Foreland. Fleetingly Augustus reveals diplomatic
activity not only with the Iberians who hold the claustra of the Darial Pass, but also with
the peoples (or some of them) who pose a threat to security from the northern side of
these Gates. It need hardly be said that the local situation here diﬀered from that obtain-
ing at the claustra in Upper Egypt and Lower Nubia. However, we should note a measure
of similarity.85 For in each case Roman diplomacy seeks to operate beyond the barriers,
84 Note also the Augustan mission of Dionysius of
Charax eastwards: Plin. nat. 6.141, with a view to
the operations of C. Caesar. Even Nero’s amber
expedition had some Augustan precedent, since a
ﬂeet had broached the Baltic: Plin. nat. 2.167.
85 For broader similarities, e. g. Wells 2005.
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while in each case too those barriers cut across local aﬃliations between the local inhab-
itants on both sides. We have observed as much for Lower Nubia, while Strabo is wholly
explicit that there were ties of kinship between the Sarmatians of the North Caucasian
Foreland and those dwelling in the mountains of northern Iberia (Strab. 11.2.1, 15–16).
When Augustus let his tally of the empire’s resources upon his death in AD 14,
he included what Tacitus calls simply “kingdoms,” regna (ann. 1.11; similarly, the author
himself, ann. 4.4, socii reges). Unfortunately, Tacitus felt the need to say no more about
Augustus’ document, so that we are let to wonder what it was that he wrote about these
kingdoms, and indeed which kingdoms were mentioned. No doubt the emperor em-
ployed his own criteria, fully thought through or not. Meanwhile, we may also presume
that he at least indicated their resources or lack thereof, and perhaps the attitudes and
reliability of their incumbent rulers and the like. However, while much remains uncer-
tain, there is no need to see a spatial consideration in Augustus’ document, nor even
in the much-cited formulation of Strabo, who stresses that kings were very much the
emperor’s area. The matter remains rather obscure.86 For example, kings of the Sarma-
tians north of the Darial Pass may well have obtained the friendship they sought from
Augustus, but it is surely incredible to imagine that he considered them to be inside the
limits of the Roman Empire in spatial terms. Similarly, the ‘Ethiopians.’ For despite the
agreement on Samos, Germanicus’ tour stopped at the claustra, while even ater Nero’s
Nile expedition and the conﬁrmation of friendship among the inhabitants far south of
Germanicus’ stopping-point, the elder Pliny persisted in taking Syene as the ﬁnis imperii
in AD 77 (nat. 12.19). Here Pliny cites the map presented to Nero by his expedition,
though it is unclear that ﬁnis imperii featured there: the term may well be Pliny’s own.87
At the same time, however, in functional terms friendly kings were insiders, ex-
pected to obey Roman commands, as we have seen. It is understandable that on the rare
occasion when Roman theorists contemplated the territorial space of regna, there was
discussion as to whether kingdomswere to be treated as formally inside the empire, with
the corollaries that might follow. Such was the problem of postliminium, where it might
matter – for practical reasons as well as in terms of legal niceties – whether Romans in
friendly kingdoms formally regained citizenship on their return from captivity further
aﬁeld, before they made their way back into a Roman province. These were interesting
technicalities which diverted jurists and might have real-world signiﬁcance to be sure,
but there is scant sign that these technicalities had signiﬁcant purchase in everyday in-
teractions at the frontier. However, the arcane issues of postliminium are valuable to our
broader understanding of Roman conceptions of friendly kingdoms in spatial terms. It
is worth stressing that juristic opinions on these matters are valuable not because we
86 E. g. Millar 1982 shows how the Senate dealt with
kings too, formally at least.
87 On the map, see above p. 137 n. 56.
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may take them to be creating Roman attitudes, but because they are attempts to formu-
late such attitudes in as coherent a manner as possible. On the spatial question (inside
or outside the empire?), the key point is that friendly kingdoms were rather open to
debate, though Roman voices tend to give the impression that they were more inside
than outside. In addition to Augustus and Strabo, we have an excerpt from the writings
of the Severan jurist Paulus, who asserts:
(A Roman citizen) is taken to have returned under postliminium when he has
entered our territorial borders (ﬁnes), just as he is lost when he has let those
borders; but also if he has come into a friendly and allied state or to a friendly
and allied king, immediately he is taken to have returned under postliminium,
because there ﬁrst he begins to be safe under public warrant (publico nomine).88
Much more important than the spatial question, however, is surely the functional one.
What Augustus’ inclusion of regna in his tally does show us is that, while there was
scope for discussion about whether and which kingdoms were inside or outside the
imperium Romanum, kingdoms were very much of the empire. Modern and ancient de-
bates about their standing in spatial terms should not distract us from that key point. It
is clear enough that Romans commonly treated friendly kings as part of the empire, even
bringing them to trial at Rome.89 While at the level of grand discourse friendly rulers
must obey imperial command, even amid the complexities of the frontier Rome ex-
pected at least substantial compliance, as much as Romans thought was suﬃcient. That
was a broad and ﬂexible approach which served Rome well, however much it may have
tested the jurists and disappointed the likes of Plutarch’s Marius and Cn. Piso. For, while
a simple dominance might be claimed at the centre of power, the empire was able to
adapt its diplomacy to the diﬀerent conditions applying in themany diﬀerent kingdoms
in Britain, Sarmatia, Ethiopia and elsewhere. The integration of friendly rulers into the
imperium Romanum emerges even among the sharpest critics of the system. In particular,
Tacitus oﬀers a vision of the Roman Principate (at least under the Julio-Claudians and
Flavians) as a force for enslavement, not only in the provinces, but at the highest levels
in Rome itself, where libertas has been abandoned as much as removed (e. g. ann. 14.49).
It is characteristic of Roman conceptions of the regna as integral features of the imperium
that Tacitus includes friendly kings too as willing participants in the process of their
own enslavement and servility, no doubt enjoying the rhetoric and emotion entailed in
the idea of the king made a slave. Libertas ﬂourishes, however imperfectly, outside the
88 Dig. 49.15.19.3 (Paulus): Postliminio redisse videtur,
cum in ﬁnes nostros intraverit, sicuti amittitur, ubi ﬁnes
nostros excessit. sed et si in civi tatem sociam amicamve
aut ad regem socium vel amicum venerit, statim postli-
minio redisse videtur, quia ibi primum nomine publico
tutus esse incipiat. Cf. Ando 2008, much concerned
with law and borders. On postliminium, Maﬃ 1992;
Lica 2001. On its relevance to kings, Cimma 1976.
89 Millar 1982, 4 gives examples.
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Roman Empire, but not in the kingdoms of that empire any more than in its Senate and
provinces.90 That is the key context for Tiridates’ remark to Nero about Corbulo: when
the king called the Roman general “a good slave,” it was as yet unclear what kind of slave
the new Parthian king of Armenia would prove to be, but, in his Parthian view (we are
asked to believe), Corbulo was already slave enough (Cass. Dio 62.6.4). That was not to
the credit of the emperor, all too comfortable with the Parthian.
With all that in view, we may concur with Isaac when he observes: “Rome regarded
all client kingdoms as part of the empire.”91 For in practice that was true in an admin-
istrative and strategic sense as well as in a moral sense. Romans like Tacitus’ Claudius
might have loty notions about the ﬁne lessons that a young king might draw from his
Roman friends, patrons and masters, but other Romans (notably Juvenal and Tacitus
himself) might focus instead on the negative, embracing both the bad eﬀects of Rome
upon kings and the malign inﬂuence of kings upon Romans.
5 Conclusion
In any analysis of the imperium Romanum of the early emperors, the interpretation, out-
look and assumptions of Tacitus tend to dominate, though the depth, complexity and
oten ironic tone of his writings make the understanding of his text phenomenally diﬃ-
cult. His process of selection, fundamental in all historiography, is central to those prob-
lems, as we have seen with our diﬃculty in providing a strong reason why he seems to
have said not a word about Nero’s Nile mission, an (apparent) omission made all the
more striking by his favourite Pliny’s enthusiastic account of the aﬀair.We should expect
his treatment of the various friendly rulers to be similarly challenging, and it is. How-
ever, we may also agree with the sentiments of David Potter, when he observes (with
regard to ann. 4.4 and 13.7):
It is plain from these statements that Tacitus regarded the client kings he men-
tions as being within the area that Rome ruled, and thus that he did not see a
great distinction between the provinces of the empire and client states when he
thought about the extent of the Roman imperium.
Potter’s assessment is part of a sophisticated argument that seeks to use interesting epig-
raphy concerning Characene to lend support to the notion that Tacitus has in mind
speciﬁcally the Persian Gulf when he mentions the rubrum mare at Annals 2.61.92 In the
present paper, I have supported the case against that view, which remains conclusive in
my judgment, though that is not to remove it completely from consideration. As for
90 Gowing 1990.
91 Isaac 1992, 397 n. 121, with bibliography.
92 Potter 1991.
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suggestions that Roman activities in Arabia were in Tacitus’ mind, there may well be
some general sense in which they did have an impact, but the fact that such a view en-
tails a sudden and unexpected switch of focus in the text from Egypt to Arabia seems to
me to be a serious problem. Instead I have argued that we should pay more attention
to developments in Nubia and, more speciﬁcally, to the major advance in the Roman
cause beyond the claustra to the Red Sea through ‘Ethiopia’ towards India. It may seem
perverse to suggest that Tacitus has this to the fore in his expression at Annals 2.61, given
that he seems to say nothing of the matter when he could (and surely should) have done
so in the Neronian books of the work (if it was not somehow in the lost ﬁnal parts,
for reasons unknown). However, we have seen that Nero’s expedition had been part of
a process, whose roots are traceable earlier, perhaps especially to the twin delegations
(‘Ethiopians’ and Indians) to Augustus on Samos. We may be sure enough that Roman
diplomacy had been very active beyond the claustra, in Nubia as elsewhere, both be-
fore Nero’s expedition and ater it down to the much-debated time of Tacitus’ writing
early in the second century AD. Germanicus himself had played a signiﬁcant part in that
diplomacy, not only with Nabataeans, but as far aﬁeld as Characene on the Persian Gulf,
otherwise known as Mesene. It is entirely likely that Germanicus was engaged in signiﬁ-
cant diplomacy with the Nubians too as he visited the claustra, if diplomacy was not in
fact a signiﬁcant part of the purpose of that visit. In any event, it is unlikely that the
Nubians would have missed the opportunity to pay their respects to the great Roman
visitor nearby, and perhaps make some requests of him. In sum, what begins to emerge
is an on-going process under the early emperors, whereby Roman imperium was indeed
stretching towards the rubrum mare in every sense of the term, embracing the Red Sea,
Indian Ocean and indeed even the Persian Gulf. Roman concern with the latter was not
new under Trajan, as is indicated by Germanicus’ diplomatic mission to Characene and
perhaps also Augustus’ earlier choice of a man of Charax to scout the east for C. Caesar.
It may well have been awareness of Germanicus’ part in this large process, as much as
(possibly, more than) Nero’s Nile expedition and other parts of the story, that prompted
Tacitus to express himself in such a general fashion about Roman progress here and,
moreover, to do so speciﬁcally at the moment in his narrative when Germanicus came
to the claustra at the interface between the Roman province of Egypt and Rome’s friends
beyond. No provincia Aethiopia was ever established or seriously attempted, but Roman
imperium could be said to have reached across Nubia to the Red Sea, even if the Nu-
bians did not see the matter in quite that way. In practice, suﬃciently compliant regna
were so much part of Rome’s imperium (functionally, if not always spatially) that matters
theoretical could be let in the hands of the jurists, whose views in any case constituted
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